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Abstract
i’he desire to create a more competitive,  market based transport system has led to the
involvement of the private sector in inf?astructure  investments. A private fìnancing of
transport infrastructure is one of the fìelds  where this trend can  be recognised. However,
there are also distinct aspects, which make it unattractive to invest in transport infrastructure
for private parties. í’bis  paper wil1  elucidate the characteristics of investments in
infì-astructure  in general, with the aim to clari>  the hesitation under private investors. In
addition, one spectftc category of infrastructure investments, viz. container terminals, wil1  be
discussed here as an exception.  Container terminals are mostlyfinanced  with involvement of
private parties. From a comparative  study between ’ normal’ investments in infrastructure
and investments in container terminal infrastructure, we wil1  argue that terminals have
several features, which lead to a lower risk for private parties, in particular restricted
competition in the terminal market and protected monopoly profts, labour productivity gains
and fa11 in unit costs, and a light regulatory framework. Because of these characteristics
public private partnerships occur rather often  and seem to be attractive. However, without
govemment support it is stil1 not realistic to attractprivate investment in the terminal market.
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1. Introduction
Transportation lies at the heart of the spatial-economie evolution of our economies  (Nijkamp
et al., 1995). A well-fùnctioning transport network is an important condition for the
competitive position of regions and cities. Today, the most prosperous locations occur where
transport nodes coincide with skilled labour locations and a high quality environment. This
has encouraged some countries to take a more pro-active approach towards transport
planning, with investment preceding rather  than following demand.  Seen from this
perspective, iní+astructure  plays a ftmdamental  role in the development of various regions.
Investments in infrastructure are for many (local) governments a critical element of their
policy. In a European context, investments in transport iníìastructure  are usually regarded as a
major incentive for economie  development, especially when one looks at the Trans European
Network (TEN) plans.
The traditional approach in Europe to transport int?astructure  has been based on detailed
govemment intervention in the sector, ostensibly to protect  the public interest (see also
section  2). In the case of infiastructure  direct state  provision has been the norm (including
f’lnancing).  However,  in recent years profound changes  in economie  and spatial policy have
brought about a re-orientation so that the dominant role of the public sector is increasingly
questioned. The trend towards market principles and liberalist views sketched  by Fukuyama
(1992),  and mirrored amongst others in devolution principles such  as deregulation,
decentralisation and privatisation, has far reaching implications for public sector involvement
in physical planning including infiastructure  planning. An important background factor is the
liberalisation of the transport market in the EU, not only for road but also  for air, rail and
waterway transport. These policy changes  wil1 have profound implications for tïnancing
European infrastructure (Henry, 1993). This trend is reinforced by developments such  as
public budget deficits in many countries and the need for more competitiveness in (semi)
public goods delivery in order to enhance efficiency.
These developments have led to the desire  to create  a more competitive, market based
transport sector in which the government does not need to fmance al1  investments in
infiastructure.  The debate  has started to give the private sector a larger role, so that a more
efficient  operation of transport inf?astructure  is realised. But this process  is not without
problems and therefore not yet generally used throughout Europe. Especially in Western and
Northem Europe experiences with privately financed infiastructure  are limited. Private
fmancing of transport infrastructure has been most significant in Latin America  and the
Caribbean region and in East Asia  (World  Bank, 1996). The present paper pays particular
attention to the problems and possibilities in private fmancing. After outlining some of the
characteristics and risks of private investment in infrastructure the focus wil1 be on a
particular kind of infìastructure; namely container terminals at (sea-)ports.  A container
terminal is a place  where  containers are transferred between any  two or more freight  transport
modes. In this interface unit loads are collected,  exchanged,  stored and/or  distributed. Private
involvement in financing  and operating container terminals in harbours is stated to be high
compared with other investments in European  transport infiastructure  such  as roads and
railways (see e.g. Farrell, 1999). The aim of the present paper is to elucidate on this theme
and to identify  particular issues why terminals are to be attractive  for private investors,  based
on a comparative  study.
This paper is organised as follows. Section  2 wil1 start with a genera1 description of the
characteristics and risks of investments in transport infiastructure  in general.  This wil1 reveal
some of the unattractivities for private parties to invest in this type of infrastructure. Section  3
wil1 elucidate on the state  of the art in fïnancing  of terminals in Europe. Section  4 wil1 focus
this discussion on financing  of terminals by describing a fiequently  observed type of
cooperation via public private partnerships. In the fïnal section  some considerations and
lessons regarding private financing and operation of infrastructure following fiom the
terminal studies wil1 be discussed.
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2. The Nature of Investments in Infrastructure
Infrastructure is a broad concept. Several defmitions and descriptions have been used in the
literature. Recently, a study on the meaning and content of this term has been carried  out  by
Nijkamp et al., 2000. Following this study infrastructure includes those real estate provisions,
which increase the efficiency of the use of production factors  and meet the following
requirements: infrastructure is directly productive,  is characterised by stock features (capita1
good) and it has the character of a (semi-) public good (non-excludability and non-rivalness).
Three categories of infiastructure can  be distinguished. Physical network infi-astructure
includes elements such  as transport infiastructure and public utilities, water management and
industrial sites and is relevant in our context. Immaterial knowledge infìastructure  and
enviromrrental  infiastructure are the two other categories. When  we refer to infìastructure  in
this paper, we mean  the  fitst  category and more in particular transport infi-astructure.
Transport infrastructure consists of several aspects  that are necessary to facilitate the
movements of goods and passengers. Well-known examples include waterways, railways and
road infrastructure, but also  seaports, airports  and telecommunication.
Traditional welfare theory argues that social  welfare can  be maximised through market
transactions based on free  exchange in perfectly operating markets.  In this ideal economy
government intervention would negatively affect the Pareto-optimal outcome. However,
following the  above-mentioned description, the market for infìastructure  is not perfectly
operating. There are market imperfections (e.g. imperfect competition, the existente  of
externalities) which make govemmental intervention necessary in this sector. The aim of the
government is then to remedy this sub-optimal allocation and in this way to move towards the
theoretically pure situation of perfect competition.
In recent years however,  it has become understood that mainly due to govemment failmes
fmancing of al1  types of infrastructure by govemments is not an appropriate solution, and
certainly not in a situation of high public sector deficits. Mistakes  in this respect might result
fiom imperfect insight into the real  demand  for public services and insufficient  recognition of
both positive and negative effects  of polities.  These failures of govemment agencies lead
often to problematic tost estimates and in several cases to inefftcient spending of public
money. Clearly, it is overly optimistic to think that these failmes wil1 completely vanish with
private fmancing of infiastructure investments. However,  from a fmancial point of view
private involvement is attractive,  as attention is focused on economie  and commercial value.
The basis for increasing economie  sustainability in the transport sector is to create  a
competitive,  market based transport system and thus to include the private sector. But the
private sector is generally not highly interested in fmancing and operating transport
infiastructure. In most cases this is caused  by the  characteristics and risks involved in
intìastructure  investments. In the sequel private involvement in infrastructure investments
wil1 briefly be discussed.  Knowing this, the characteristics and risks for these types of
investments wil1 be investigated.
2.1 Options for private fìnance in transport
Private fmancing of construction is usually associated with continuing public sector
responsibility for strategie  network and locational planning. In the case of tol1  roads and urban
mass transit iníìastructure,  private tïrms are normally given a concession to manage and
operate  the facility for a certain period, with ownership of the asset  returning at some point to
the public sector. The same holds  true for investments in container terminals (see section  3
and 4). There are several ways in which the private sector can contribute  to the  transport
system (ITS, 1999). Several examples of private contributions to financing, and of more far
reaching private sector involvement are given below. In section  4.1 we apply these types of
public private partnerships to the container terminal market with the help of the theoretical
background of Dietrich ( 1994).
- A tax can  be imposed on farms in a region; reflecting the broad transport benetïts obtained
by these tïrms or fïrms in a region; the French Versement is an example.
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- A more focused charge can  be levied reflecting the specific  transport benefits obtained by
a particular property; the US concept of value Capture is based on this principle.
- The private sector can  be involved directly in financing new investment, as happens  with
many rail projects, with the operator of the infrastructure repaying the loan.
- The private sector can  be involved in the operation, with the private sector operator
obtaining its revenue directly from the user.
The fïrst two of these have no direct effect on the specifïcation of a transport strategy;
besides, fnms  are only indirectly involved in fïnancing (and not investing). But it may wel1
help to make the strategy financially  feasible for the public sector. The third introduces the
impact of private sector objectives, which wil1 emphasise a financial return on investment in
the specifïc  measures covered.  The private sector may be more willing to invest in particular
projects than others, and this could influence the formulation of the strategy. The last example
introduces the implementation of charges on users, through fares, parking charges or road use
charges. These charges wil1 be determined in order to maximise  revenue, and this can
significantly affect the performance of the overall strategy. For example, higher  fares
designed to produce  a return on investment in a new urban rail system may reduce  patronage
and hence the contribution to congestion relief  and environmental protection wil1 decrease.
The private sector usually seeks for commercial profit to be gained either as returns from
investment interests, or as value Capture through improvements in the transport system.
Despite the higher  costs  of capita1 raised from commercial sources and the need to cover the
risks and gaining commercial profit, it has been argued that the overall tost for the
community could be lower with private financing, than if the govemment would provide  the
facilities from taxation funds. The following objectives for private fïnancing can  be identifïed
(ITS, 1999):
- Minimisation of the impact of additional taxation, debt burden or tïnancial guarantees on
the finances of the govemment
- Introduction of the benefits of private sector management and control  techniques in the
construction and operational phases of the projects (possibly  leading to lower costs)
- Promotion of private entrepreneurial initiative and innovation in infrastructure projects
- Increase in the financial resources that might be available for the projects.
In container terminal investments especially the second  and fourth objective  for involvement
of private container terminal operators do apply. Private fmance can  be said to be only purely
private if (ITS, 1999):
- The private party runs al1  risks, and
- The investment is paid directly by its users, and
- The operation is based upon  user charges
In practice,  transport infrastructure is rarely fulfllling  these requirements. Almost al1
European transport infrastructure (except  tol1  roads in France,  Italy and Spain)  has been
financed and operated by govemments or by public organisations tied to the government. The
backgrounds  related to this high public involvement wil1 be discussed  in the next subsection.
2.2 Characteristics of investments in infrastructure
Investments in infrastructure have some special features. Broadly speaking one can  identify
seven characteristics of investments in infiastructure  (ECMT, 1990 and Nijkamp et al., 1997).
Firstly, the expectation of the economie life  of infiastructure is very long. This may range
from  20 years to more than a century. The pay-back  period of infiastructure  investments is
also  long; usually around 15 to 30 years. The pay-back  period for normal capita1 goods is
generally much shorter; the average  is 8 to 9 years.
A second  characteristic in many cases is the relatively low leve1  of the operational (variable)
costs, especially on longer distance infìastructure. There are some overhead, maintenance and
labour costs,  but compared to the construction costs  of infìastructure or the exploitation costs
of other investments, these costs  are relatively low.
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Thirdly, during the construction time, a Zarge  amount of capifal is required. Often  high loans
have to be acquired, which makes  the interest costs relatively high. The costs are also
influenced by the project financier; the govemment is usually able to attract loans which are
cheaper (i.e., lower interest rates)  than the private sector.
Another feature of infiastructure investments is that the waiting period prior to actual
injkzstructure construction can  be very long. This has to do with the many legal decision-
making procedures, resistance by society and interest groups, and other time consuming
formalities. These formalities often lead to project changes that have a major influence on the
costs of projects. During this planning process  different unforeseen facts  may thus happen
which are of critical influence on the whole project and may even lead to planning disasters
(see Hall, 1990). In fact,  this situation makes  it very difficult  to make a reliable and good tost
estimation at the beginning of a project. Ideally, everything should be clear  when the
construction of the project starts, so that then a good estimation should be possible.
A fïfth  characteristic is the irreversibility of the investment once  the project has started. If the
construction is discontinued,  this would lead to a significant capita1 loss, because it is not
possible to use the investment in another way. In fact,  once  started, the project wil1 be built if
it is within the budget of the government. It is clear  that the agency responsible for the project
wants to finance it as soon as possible. One may safely assume that the costs of the project at
that stage are as low as possible to ensure that the project wil1 be executed. This suggests that
the costs may be somewhat underestimated at the beginning of a project.
The next feature of infìastructural investments is the Zong construction period. This period
may take two to seven years depending on the scale  of the project. During this period there
are no revenues, but there  are of course already  interest and other costs. This long
construction period also  makes  it more difftcult  to offer a good tost estimate, as several
extemal factors  may influence the project during this period, one example being the rise in the
price  level.
The fmal characteristic is the uniqueness of each  infrastructure project. Each  infiastructure
project is different from another. This fact  wil1 likely have an influence on the tost
estimations, because of missing experience, low leaming possibilities and lack  of
comparability.
The above mentioned characteristics show that at the outset of a project high tïnancial capita1
outlays are needed. This makes  private investors more reluctant, because their flexibility tends
to decline. The high costs at the beginning of a project are not immediately compensated for
by high cash-flows. There are apparently many risks involved in infiastructure projects; these
wil1 be discussed  in the next section.
2.3 Risks in infrastructure  investments
The major issue in involving private finance for transport infiastructure investments concerns
the sharing of risk. In infrastructure investments the flow of revenues  often begins many years
after the initial investment; this increases uncertainty and risk compared to altemative
investment options. Investments in infìastructure incorporate  various risks; the following
classes may be distinguished (Nijkamp et al., 1995):
l politica1 risks; for example, changes in transport policy or regulations by the government;
l fmancial risks; for example, fluctuations in interest rates  and exchange rates,  and false
expectations about inflation;
l construction risks; for example, delays, unexpected and higher or lower costs;
l operational risks; for example, damage by accidents  and vandalism;
0 commercial risks; for example, wrong tost estimates or wrong estimates of the traffic
volume.
Al1  these risks make it difftcult  to draw  up a reliable tost and demand  estimation, because
each  risk bas  its distinct influence on these variables; for example, a new law  supporting
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environmental protection. A policy shift may lead to the construction of a road tunnel to
protect  a natura1 area, whereas at the outset of the project, the road was scheduled to cross the
area. This leads, of course, to higher  costs that could never have been estimated at the start of
the project. A clear example of commercial risks is formed by the Scandinavian bridge
crossing the Sont where  trafftc was highly overestimated leading to disappointing tol1
revenues. In a later part of our paper we wil1 come  back to ,the  risk problem and apply the
different risk categories  to container terminal investment projects  (see section  4.1 and 4.3).
The construction costs (including interest costs) of infrastmcture are, up to a certain leve1 of
demand,  fixed; the other costs are partly fixed and partly variable. The fixed costs are very
high for an investor when compared with competing investments, while variable and marginal
costs are normally relatively low. When  the price  is set according to marginal costs (which is
economically optimal), it is often not possible to make a satisfactory return on investment.
The variable costs per volume of transport are for reasons of simplicity assumed to be
constant, which is a rather  plausible assumption as long as the capacity of infiastructure  is
sufftcient. As a consequente also  the marginal costs are constant until there is a lack  of
capacity. From Figure 2.1 it becomes clear that price  pi is economically optimal for an
investor (this corresponds with the point where  marginal revenues  are equal to marginal
costs). The total number of transported volume equals q, while total revenues  correspond to
the area OqApi.  The total costs are equal to the area OqBpz,  leading to a loss of this project of
area pip*BA.  In this case it is not possible to find a price  at which the project is profitable,
because fïxed costs could not be covered  from the revenues. It is now only possible to operate
the infi-astructure  project at a profit, when extemal fïnancing is obtained (trom the
govemment or other interested parties). The average  total tost curve is then lower. When  it is
located below A, a profit wil1 be made.
price Average
tbal ccsts
\
Margd  \
Marginal  costs =
variable costs
revenues  Avexage revenues
9 Volume of tn3nsport
Figure 2.1: Market situation for an investor in inhstruch~~  (Nijkamp et al., 1995)
From the aforementioned risks, the politica1 risks are the most pressing compared to other
investments. The govemment has many reasons to interfere in the transport market. As
mentioned earlier, there is on the long run always a danger of changes in laws or regulations,
or there may even be a change of government and thus a change of transport policy.
In conclusion, because of the  high risks of investments in iníìastructure  compared to other
investment opportunities, these investments are often  tmattractive for private investors. There
must be a high-risk compensation for these private investors if they are to participate  into
these types of investments. This compensation may stem from high profit  expectations, as is
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shown by some road tunnel projects in the Netherlands. Another option is that govemments
make these investments more attractive,  if they do not want to finance these projects directly.
They could do so by means  of joint-risk constructions (guaranteeing a public subsidy if the
use of iní%&ucture  is below the expectations), or by guaranteeing a minimum profit  ratio.
From the foregone the backgrounds  of difficulties to attract private interest in the financing
and investment of infrastructure projects have been clarified. However,  there are some forms
of iníìastructure where  private involvement seems to occur more often.  The
telecommunication sector may be one example, another is related to infiastructure  in (sea-
)ports.  The next section  wil1 analyse investments in a specifïc  segment of ports, namely
container terminals. It is interesting to analyse why such  terminals are more interesting
investment objects  compared to other transport infrastructure.
3 Container terminal investment: European state of the art
3.1 Investments in por& in genera1
Containerisation has led to the development of increasingly bigger and bigger vessels, while
maritime competition has resulted in the  formation of alliances of container carriers. This
development has forced  port authorities and container terminal operators to increase their
scale  as well. The location of individual ports is rapidly becoming less important in favour of
the extent to which its services and hinterland connections fit into the alliance networks (See
also  van Klink, 1995). In the past decades, reputations and businesses of European ports were
primarily built on their locations in protected harbours, near major rivers or with access  to
industrial centres.  However,  networking -rather  than location- seems the key to future growth
of ports. Furthermore, the volumes per alliance are enormous  and wil1 probably result in
single user container terminals and in the medium term maybe even in single-user container
networks.
Ports are rapidly becoming a normal industry through,  the injection of private money that
ensures greater competition, higher productivity and probably lower costs.  The transformation
process  of the last two decades, which few other industries can  match, has been one of the
main drivers of this development. In Europe, the UK is at the forefront of these developments.
Recently, mainland Europe is catching up as govemments loosen  their grip on ports and
container terminals. Ports are becoming landlords and lease container facilities to private
companies.  Even port authorities are linking up. More consolidation is to follow with the UK
and Germany leading the way. The most notable exception in this process  is France.  So far,
the benefits of private involvement in ports are strictly limited to container terminals. Ports  -
and especially container terminals - have become a real  business and money from
conglomerates  and aggressive equity funds is flowing in. Until very recently, politica1
interference and the structure  of port management has not changed  to meet the new
circumstances, but markets  are changing. Ports are stil1 politica1 business, except  for the UK
where  the industry is almost completely privatised.
In Figure 3.1 we have depicted the actors and their relations with respect to investment in
container terminals in general.  In Northem European landlord  ports the most common
fïnancial structure  is one in which the government pays for access  to the port by land and sea,
an (autonomous) port authority funds infrastructure such  as land reclamation and quay  walls,
and private container terminal operators fund the suprastructure: paving, buildings and
mechanica1 equipment. Infi-astructure  costs  are recovered to a greater or lesser extent through
charges on ships and cargo, and rental  and leasing payments fiom the container-handling
companies.  However,  there remain large differences in the leve1 of public sector financial
support, which are passed on into port tariffs. In southern Europe, port authorities and/or  the
state  were until recently responsible for almost  al1  port investment, including mechanica1
equipment and superstructure as wel1  as iníìastructure. This was the result of vertical
integration (Greece), the strength of the unions (Italy), the weak fïnancial position of the
private stevedores (Spain)  or the treatment of ports as a public service (France).  However,  the
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reforms of the early 1990s and the move towards landlord  ports have resulted in a gradual
convergente  of fïnancial structures  in northem and southem Europe.
Local/Regional
Government
National
Government
::.
Terminal Operator
I
4-l.
Containers n l Tmnssbipmcnt
n
n
1 Continental Tr?--+  1 I Container CarriersCompanit,
+ = Paymcnt for a service or for infrastrocturc
**-*‘*, = Supply of the service  tmnshipmcnt  of containers
l **+ = Supply of infmstructm&ontaincrs
Figure 3.1: An overview of actors and relations in container terminal  investment
Source:  based on Wiegmans  et al., 1999
It appears that private involvement in fmancing container terminals in harboum  is high
compared to other investments in transport infiastructure such  as roads and railways. A
possible explanation is that container terminal operations are too complex for cities and
regions; another explanation for private involvement may be fotmd  in the increasing
efficiency of privately run terminals. A third explanation may come  fiom the increasing scale
of container terminals and another part of the picture may be found in the fact  that operating a
container terminal is no longer considered as a core  business of governments. Reasons for
governments  to be stil1 involved in container terminal investing are to be found in the creation
of employment and also  the fact  that ensuring sufficient  provision of infiastructure is
sometimes stil1 considered as government core  business.
3.2 Container Terminal Infrastructure Investments
Container terminals form a centra1 part of the transport infrastructure for fieight  transport. A
terminal is a place  where  goods are transferred between any two or more freight  transport
modes and is often located at modal transfer points (such  as harbours) (see also  Wiegmans  et
al., 1999). In the terminal market we have two important groups: owners and operators:
1 . terminal owners  who  are nat providing the terminal services by themselves (investors).
Basically, there are three forms of terminal ownership; privately owned, publicly owned,
or a public/private partnership. Especially the third form of ownership can  tùrther
complicate  daily operations, because the actors ofien have conflicting interests;
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2 . terminal operators who  provide  the terminal service assortment. The terminal operation
can  be accomplished by a railway company, seaport company, shipping line, private
compw consortium, independent regional operator, multimodal shipping
companies/forwarders,  road haulage industry, and/or  even cities.
The aim of the terminal operator is to provide  the customer with terminal services for the best
possible price.  Terminal service quality may be looked upon  from three perspectives
(Hilferink, 1994); i) customer-oriented; ii) netwerk-oriented;  iii) production-oriented. In this
paper we concentrate  on the production-oriented approach in order to fïnd out  the tost
elements of a container terminal and to identify  the differente  between the fïnancing of
terminal infiastructure  and iníìastructure in general.  It is often claimed that costs  per container
handling generated by terminals are high. However,  several genera1 indicators suggest that
terminal service charges are not exceptionally expensive (Societa  per Azioni, 1991, CBS,
1998):
1. The average  financial results of terminal operators in genera1 (in the Netherlands) are not
extremely high (average  5,1%  of terminal sales)
2. The terminal handling may be expensive, but the total tost figure of the combined
transport Channel as a whole  is far more important. Therefore, it is more important to look
at terminal service charges from a marketing charme1 perspective
3. The price/quality ratio per transhipment is not wel1  balanced. Terminals may provide  their
customers with pre-defïned quality levels and clear  tost figures to justify  their terminal
handling prices.
As a starting point we use the table below in order to distinguish between the various tost
elements of maritime container terminals. A container terminal can  basically be developed in
three ways: a new container terminal can be developed on a greenfield  site,  an existing
container terminal can  be extended, and an industrial site  can  be redeveloped into a container
terminal. Furthermore, we distinguish between four different categories  of terminal
investments:
1 . Infiastructure investments consist of investments in rail, road, barge  and sea facilities to
the terminal (terminal external).
2. Terminal structure  investments consist of specifïc  investments (e.g. quays, cranes,  and
crane  rails) in terminal iníìastructure (terminal internal).
3 . Investments in the terminal suprastructure are investments on the terminal site  that are not
specific  for a container terminal (e.g. terminal buildings, pavements, lighting, etc.).
4. ITstructure  investments are al1  information technology investments needed for the
container terminal.
Table 3.1: Ways to develop a container terminal and investment categories
New CT Exteosion of CT Redevelopment
Infrastructun X X
Termln8l  stn~cture  X X x
Suprartructure X X X
ITstructure X X X
X = high importante  in financial tems, x = average  importante  in fmancial  term
Source: Wiegmans  et al., 1999
Due to lack  of data it is not possible to provide  exact insight into tost components  of
container terminals in genera1 (both  continental and maritime). However,  there is a study
from TIJ  Delft (1995) which provides  some insight into the tost elements of very smal1
container terminals (mostly continental terminals).
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3.3 Investments in container terminals: characteristics and risks
In this subsection we combine the theory about investments in infiastructure (section  2) and
the specific  case of investments in container terminals. We pay  particular attention to the
rationale for public sector activity in container terminal investments in combination with
interaction with private firms. According to Dietrich (1994) two important principles have
had an important influence on economie  perspectives on the public sector and its relationships
with private sector activities. Fitst, the two sectors are involved in separate activities with
different responsibilities. Secondly, the public sector must restrict itself to developing a legal
and economie  infmstructure. As govemment activity is based on the power of the state,
contacts can  be either based on govemments determining infì-astructural conditions within
which private actors operate  autonomously, or contacts can  be direct and interactive.
Figure 3.2: Cost and benefit  relationships between govemments and fm
Source: Dietrich, 1994, adapted
In the left part of Figure 3.2 we observe that the govemment is more efficient  in tost terms
but the reverse  holds for benefits.  On the tost side  private sector failwes  exist, perhaps
because of the public good characteristics of the activity in question with resulting fiee-rider
problems. This is the case in container terminal investment where  especially access  to
terminals via road, rail and water carry public good characteristics. Also  the tïxed lease term
means  that container terminal operators are not willing to invest huge amounts in a container
terminal that after the lease period can  be contracted  to another operator. In the right-hand
part of Figure 3.2 we observe that from a tost perspective farms are more efficient  indicating
that the activity in question is readily marketable. Resource benefits however,  indicate
advantages of govemment activity. This might indicate  the existente  of private sector failures
(i.e., relative inability to change the characteristics of activities).
In the container terminal market it seems that the left part of Figure 3.2 holds true. Risks  for
private companies  to invest huge amounts of money in container terminals are high, due to the
long expected economie  life of intìastructure. This may range fiom 20 years to more than a
century. The pay-back  period of infiastructure investments is also  long; usually around 15 to
30 years. Private investments usually must generate  profits in a far more restricted time period
(e.g. 5-10 years). Secondly, the relatively low leve1 of the operational (variable) costs,
imposes a íùrther risk increase for the  private container terminal investor. Thirdly, during the
construction time, a large amount of capita1 is required. Often  high loans have to be acquired
and the govemment is usually better able to attract cheaper loans (i.e., lower interest rates).
Fourthly, the waiting period prior to actual infiastructure construction can be very long due to
politica1 decision making. These formalities often lead to project changes  that have a major
influence on the costs  of projects.  In general,  private companies  are not willing to run these
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politica1 risks, which forms another reason for govemment intervention. Fifthly,  the
irreversibility of the investment once  the project has started causes  another risk for private
parties. If the construction is discontinued,  this would lead to a significant capita1 loss, and
this is another reason for govemment intervention to reduce  the initial risks. Sixthly, the long
construction period during which there are no revenues, imposes a lùrther risk increase for
private terminal operators. In the beginning there are already  interest and other costs which
calls for a governmental role. Finally, each  container terminal investment is more or less
tmique.  This makes  it difficult  to learn from mistakes  made in the past. Overall, govemments
probably step into container terminal investment to decrease the risks for the private terminal
operator. Without govemment intervention the risks of container terminal investments are
relatively high compared with the low expected rates  of return on investments.
Despite these risks, private involvement in financing  and operating container terminals in
harbours appears strong compared to other investments in transport infrastructure such  as
roads and railways. Public Private Partnerships (PPP) is a well-known term in this respect.
Compared with investments in road and rail projects,  Public Private Partnerships are often
used for container terminals. In general,  the (public) port authority is the provider of the
suprastructure, whereas the private company operates the container terminal service portfolio.
The construction of the terminal also  involves financial aid of port authorities (e.g. through
leasing constructions). The construction of a bulk terminal in the port of Amsterdam (starting
in 1997) is a good example of this. The private company “Waterland Terminal” operates a
terminal in Amsterdam, which is pre-fïnanced by the Gemeentelijk Havenbedrijf Amsterdam
(GHA, port authority of Amsterdam). Banks were not interested, as it would be too risky for
them. The terminal is paid back via a rent-buy construction (not a subsidy). Besides this,
GHA also  provided quays and land, which are rented by Waterland terminal. It seems that the
same problem holds true for investments in container terminals. Banks are not interested or
only when the pay-back  period is less than ten years. Involvement of govermnental bodies
enables a reduction of the pay-back  period to 15-20  years which makes  the project tïnancially
feasible. According to Farrell (1999) there are several reasons why ports have been more
successful  than other modes of transport in attracting private capital:
- There was an earlier recognition of the distinction between infrastructure and services.
Port infiastructure  is subsidised in most European commies,  allowing service providers  to
make healthy profits at prices  that are perceived as reasonable by their customers. The
assignment of iníìastructure  to terminal operators in large blocks - which is quite unlike
the ‘open access’  stevedoring arrangements found in some other parts  of the world - has
restricted competition fiom new entrants and protected monopoly profits (an opposite
position is faced  by the railways).
- The second  reason for private sector interest in container terminals is the labour
productivity gains in recent years, and the steady fa11 in unit costs due to economies  of
scale,  which have not always been passed on to container terminal (port) users through
lower tariffs. Private operators taking over the management of a public facility have
usually been able to improve on past profït levels through the introduction of more
flexible labour practices.  The limited supply of terminals suitable for leasing and the high
costs of building  new infi-astructure  allow these profit levels to be maintained. Moreover,
inside most container ports there is only one container terminal operator, which suggests
the existente  of regional monopolies.
- Furthermore, most container terminals involve relatively low risks after  govemment
intervention. The amounts of private investment required are stil1 relatively smal1 in
comparison with other transport modes - the suprastructure for a two berth container
terminal costs around ECU 50-100 million, which is equivalent to only 10-20 km of
motorway. Most of the assets  are mobile, with wel1  developed second  hand markets.
Private investment in container terminals is therefore not such  a leap in the dark as it is in
other transport modes.
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- The final factor encouraging private investment is the relatively light regulatory
framework. Container ports are perceived to operate  in a highly competitive  market, and
do not offer a standard product. There has also  been a convergente  of interest between the
private container terminal operators and their respective  port authorities, united by their
efforts to compete against other container ports.
The main issues in involving private finance for transport infrastructure investments, concerns
the sharing of risk and ensuring higher efficiency. These are the main reasons that
governments are interested in attracting private parties towards public infiastructure
investment projects  through long leasing contracts  and operational involvement. In general,  in
infíastructure  investments the flow of revenues  often begins many years after the initial
investment; tbis increases uncertainty and risk for a private party or consortium compared to
altemative investment options. In general,  investments in infiastructure incorporate  various
risks for private parties. Currently, in the specific  case of investments in container terminals
these risks seem to be effectively shared between governmental bodies and private parties.
The exact risk sharing depends on the lease contract both parties have agreed on. However,
some genera1 statements on the various risk components  can  be given (see Table 4.1).
Table 3.2: Container terminal investment categories  and investment risks
Pay-back  Operationel  Capita1 Wding  Irreversible  Constructioa  uniquenesr
COSQ
Politieal  risk G G G G G G G
Financial  risk GIP GP GiP G G/P G G/P
Construction  risk G/P GlP GiP G G/p G/p G
Opwatlonal  risk P G/P P G P Gff P
Commercial risk P P P G P G/p P
G = govemment, P = private party; in this case the  terminal operator
Source: Wiegmans  et al., 1999
In Table 3.2 we connected the genera1 characteristics of investments in iníìastructure  with the
risk factors  associated with investing in infrastructure.  In general,  the government runs the
politica1 risk of al1  characteristics of the investment in a container terminal. The terminal
operator is ‘safeguarded’ from this risk by the government. The financial risks are shared
between the government and the private terminal operator through lease constructions. The
govemmental body mainly carries  the construction risks of the container terminal. The private
terminal operator nms both the operational risk and the commercial risk. Besides reducing the
risks mentioned above for private container terminal operators, the govemmental body (port
authority) can  realise public benefits as well:
l With the construction of a new container terminal a city wil1 receive  more seaport tariffs
and an increase in employment. These (fmancial) benefits are extra benefts  above the
amount resulting fiom the lease of the terminal facilities. In case of a road or railway there
are in genera1 no extra long-term benefits for the govemment;
l In a port it is possible to create  more terminal facilities and thus to favour competition  in
that particular harbour. In case of a road or railway this is not possible;
l In general,  a container terminal has to compete with container terminals in other harbours
for transhipment volume (inter-port competition).  In the case of a road or railway there is
ofien no serious altemative (regional monopoly);
l Both the Port Authority and the terminal operator have the same interest (creating or
maintaining an excellent port). In case of a road or railway the main interest of a
government seems to get part of the project financed  by private parties, whereas private
parties are interested in making profits out  of that particular project.
In general,  container terminal investment and PPP carries  extra benefits compared with road
and rail investment for both private terminal operators and governmental bodies.
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4. The relation between risks, profits, and Public Private
Partnerships
Public Private Partnerships in container terminal investments (botb  maritime and continental
terminals) are operational and successful because it is possible to share risks and because the
projects provide  profits for both the government (through extra port tariffs) and for the
terminal operator (through regular container transshipment). Currently, container terminals
are normally operated on a common-user basis, and have different characteristics (Farrell,
1999):
l Terminals have been transferred to the private sector as leasehold concessions rather  than
privately built installations;
l Because container terminals have high capita1 costs, most ports can  support only one
operator -  even where  traffic  is sufficient to support 2-3 competing operators, there may
be collusion in the  way the market is shared;
l Customers are shipping lines rather  than tramp services making them more responsive to
quality of service than to price;
l Container lines have a greater choice of ports than bulk shippers and are more mobile,
leading to fierce  inter-port  competition.
Lately, we have seen the development of the tïrst single-user container terminals in Europe
(e.g. P&O,  Antwerp, Euromax, Rotterdam). Due to the increasing scale  of container carriers
and the continuing development of the conferences (cooperation between a number of
carriers), volume seems sufficient to justifl single-user terminals providing just the services
as they are needed (See also  Benacchio et al., 2000).
A distinction has to be made between different tost elements of container terminals to be able
to provide  insight into the sharing of risks and profits. We investigated each  tost component
in order to be able to provide  insight into the costs per container and the costs per Twenty-feet
Equivalent Unit (TEU)  for smal1 continental container terminals (see Appendix). These tost
figures give some insight into the tost structure  of an investor in container terminals. Based
on this information we tried to compose  a @ure similar to Figure 1. Figure 3.4 presents a
short term investment situation where  it is profitable  for a private company to invest in a
terminal. It should be noted that this figure is only valid under certain assumptions. We
assume a public private partnership between tbe  private party and the port authority. As a
consequente investment costs are reduced via lease contracts  (although the amounts of
required private investments are already  relatively small). From the above this appears to be a
valid assumption. This results in a lower average  total costs curve, which is below the average
revenues  curve. The variable costs per unit are not constant anymore. Price  wil1 be set at PI
and the terminal operator wil1 make a profit of pip 2AB.  For this to be true we assume that the
container terminal operator fïxes a price  at leve1 pi and that no price  discrimination takes
place.  In this case it is interesting for private companies  to invest in a terminal under these
circumstances. However,  in practice  prices  are subject to competitive powers of container
carriers and wil1 be lower than leve1 pi.
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price
P’
P
0
Average
total costs
Marginal  costs =
variable costs
i! ’ revenues Average  revenues
9 Numberofcontainers
Figure 4.1: Market situation for an investor in terminals
Source:  Nijkamp et al., 1995, adapted
Some remarks are in order concerning this analysis. The variable tost  curve is almost vertical
when the capacity of the terminal is not sufftcient anymore to handle al1  containers. More
containers can  only be transshipped when  capacity is enlarged and al1  other measures to
enlarge current capacity have been used (e.g. longer terminal operating hours, increase the
number of cranes,  employ more people, longer port operating hours, etc.). Besides, the
situation above indicates  that it is interesting for other companies  to enter this container
terminal market. New entrants lead to new tost structures  and other equilibria. However,  we
focused  on the short run situation for only one terminal operator in a certain port. The
situation wil1 be affected  by new entrants within the same port or by new strategies of other
competing ports. As a consequente this wil1 affect pricing polities  of the investor. But there
has been a convergente  of interest between the private operators and their port authorities,
united by their efforts to compete  against other ports (Farrell, 1999). This weakens the
possible threat of competition. In addition, the economies  of scale  available to established
operators puts them in a strong competitive position.
It may be clear  that operating a terminal can  be protïtable  and from this perspective
interesting to private parties for investment. But it stil1 is without doubt that the role of port
authorities should not be neglected. Differences in financial performance are not simply a
question of some operators being more efftcient than others, but are strongly influenced by
government policy towards container terminal investment ftmding. For example, a contract to
operate  the terminal for 15 years results in a completely different flnancial @ure compared to
a lease period of 30 years. The tost structures  of private terminals are also  affected  by the
way port authorities attempt  to recover  infrastructure costs í?om  port users, as they have a
considerable  amount of discretion in how  they do this.
4. f Current  practise in terminals investment in Europe
From a theoretical point of view, a container terminal can be developed in three ways: a new
container terminal can  be developed on a greenfield site,  an existing container terminal can be
extended, and an industrial site  can  be redeveloped into a container terminal. In container
terminal investment projects  we distinguish between four different categories  of terminal
investments:
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1 . Infrastructure investments consist of investments in rail, road, barge,  and sea facilities to
the terminal (terminal extemal and usually provided by the port authority). Usage  is paid
for through port tariffs;
2. Terminal structure  investments consist of specific  investments (e.g. quays, cranes,  and
crane  rails) in terminal infiastructure  (terminal intemal and usually partly provided by the
port authority). Usage  is paid for by the terminal operator through long term lease
contracts;
3 . Investments in the terminal suprastructure are investments on the terminal site that are not
specifíc for a container terminal (e.g. terminal buildings, pavements, lightning, etc. and
paid for by the terminal operator). Usage  is paid for by the container terminal users
through transshipment tariffs;
4. ITstructure  investments are al1  information technology investments needed for the
container terminal and are paid by the terminal operator. Usage  is paid for by the
container terminal users through transshipment tariffs.
In Table 4.2 we then turn to a number of cases in the Netherlands extended with some
information of container terminals in other European countries in order to analyse Public
Private Partnerships in practice.  An overview is presented of some core  variables of
investments in container terminals.
Table 4.1 Investments in terminals in tbe Netberlands
Terminal Name LUCdOll Invostment Capacity Mdn  customers Transpor  Investment
Ccres  Paragon Marine Terminal (NT) Anlstcrdam
oosterhout  (NT) Oosterhout
Alphen aan de Rijn (NT) Alphen
IMCA (R) Amstcniam
wcr  Pm Vlissingen
Valburg (NT) Nijmegen
Zeeland Container Terminal (NT) Tcrneuzcn
Beverwijk (NT) Bcvcnvijk
Container Terminal regio Twente (NT) Hengelo
wanssum  (NT)
Container terminal Zutphen (NT)
Moerdijk  Container  Terminal  (E)
Euromax  Container Terminal (NT’)
Shell Haven (R)
Trinity Container Terminal (E)
Container Terminal Deurne (NT)
m(NT)
Containerterminal  Duinkcrken  (E)
Harwich Container Terminal (E)
Southampton CT (NT)
Riva Terminal Wielshcke  (NT)
wanssum
Zutphen
Moerdijk
ROttcrdam
Londen
Felixstowe
Deurne
Bramen
Duinkerken
Harwich
Southampton
Wielshcke
te)
172 mln
22,5  mln
22,s  mln
550 mln
550 mln.
31  mln
6mln
4,6  mln
IOmln
7 mln.
20 min
525 mln.
835 mln.
ll4mln.
4.9 mln
260 mln.
IS mln.
160  mln.
860 mln.
5 mln.
(TEü/yeär)
95o.ooo
25.OOO
l5O.OOO
2.5OO.OOO
1.4OO.OOO
lOO.OOO
4o.OOO
22.500
Ikea
Heinekm
DOW
corua,  Cargill
Grolsch
Vrcdestein
Addinw  Opijnen
P&O Nedlloyd
Gossclin  Moving
TEu (KJ
1 8 0
150
220
415
310
150
205
465
135
310
240
230
70
Average 208 912.ooo - - 225
Container development plan: NT = New Terminal, E = Extension, R = Redevelopment
Source: Joumal of Commerce, Cargoweb Newsletter, annual report of ECT and HHLG, and Nieuwsblad
Transport, 1999 and 2OOO
We observe that the total investment amount varies between 860 mln. and 4,6  mln. Euro. It is
important to note the differente  between continental terminals (capacity usually under
100.000 TEU)  and maritime container terminals (capacity mainly over 100.000 TEU).
Terminal capacities are varying between 15.000 and 3.500.000 TEU  a year in these cases.
Almost al1  terminals are either barge  oriented or deepsea oriented. Initial investment costs
vary between 135-465 Euro per TEU.  Unfortunately, it is for most terminals impossible to
provide  detailed information on tost categories, lease contracts, capacity usage,  and
cost/TEU.
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Table 4.2 Investments in terminals  in Europe  and public-private partuerships
Terminal Name Investment
amount (e)
Public Private Caprcity Pubk-Private
Iavestment Investment (TEU) Partnership
ratio (%)
Ceres Pamgon  Marine Terminal
oosterhout
Alphen aan de Rijn
IMCA
WCT
Valburg
Zeeland Container Terminal
Bevenvijk
Container Terminal regio Twente
WSllSSUXIl
Container terminal Zutphen
Moerdijk Container Terminal
Euromax Container Terminal
Shell Haven
Trinity Container Terminal
Container Terminal Deurne
Containerterminal Duinkerken
River Terminal Wielsheke (NT)
Harwich Container Terminal
Southampton CT
172 mln 128,5 mln. 435 min. 950.000 75-25
_’ 25.000
22,5 mln
22.5 mln 150.000
550 mln. 2.500.000
550 mln. 1.400.000
31 mln 17 mln. 14 mln. 75.000 55-45
6 mln 1,4  mln. 4,6mln. - 23-77
4.6 mln 2,8  mln. 1,8  mln 22.500 60-40
10 mln
7 mln. 15.000
20 mln - 150.000
525 mln. 300 mln. 225 mln. 1.700.000 57-43
835 mln. 3.500.000
114 mln. 500.000
4,9  mln
260 mln.
15 mln. 9 mln 6 mln 60-40
5 mln. 2.4 2.6 75.000 48-52
1.700.000
860 mln.
Average 208 mln.
NT = New Terminal, E = Extension, R = Redevelopment
Source: Joumal  of Commerce,  Cargoweb  Newsletter, annual report ECf and HHLG, and Nieuwsblad Transport, 1999 and 2000
66 mln. 43 mln. 912.000 55-45
We observe that the Public-Private ratio varies between 23-77 for the container terminal in
Beverwijk and 75-25 for the Ceres Paragon Marine Terminal in Amsterdam. Almost al1
container terminals are Public Private Partnerships in which the govemment contributes
considerable  amotmts  to the fïnancing  of container terminals. Due to a lack  of data only a
genera1 overview can  be presented here. In the next section  we wil1 look in more detail to
three of the container terminal investment projects and special attention is paid to the
investment components  conceming a new container terminal, an extension of an existing
terminal, and the redevelopment of an existing site.
4.2 Three terminal case studies and Public Private Partnership
We selected  three cases to be better able to look into detail into investment components  and
the differences between the development of a new container terminal (Ceres, Amsterdam), the
redevelopment of an existing site  (Shell Haven, London), and the extension of an existing
container terminal (Port of Felixstowe, Felixstowe).
Ceres Paragon Marine Terminal Amsterdam
The terminal in Amsterdam is a joint project of Ceres Terminals Inc. and the Port
Management of Amsterdam. Total investment is estimated at 172 million Euro and the
terminal wil1 be fully  operational by mid 2001. Total extra employment is estimated around
600. Ceres Terminals Inc. wil1 invest 43.5 million Euro (terminal buildings) and the
Amsterdam Port Authority invests 128.5 million Euro in infìastructure  and part of the cranes.
Recently, the contract for al1  construction activities (such  as berth doek,  quay  walls, paving,
lightning, fencing, drainage, electrical systems, and other subsoil infrastructure; rail terminal
and crane  rails) bas  been awarded for 4 1 million Euro.
Port of Felixstowe (United Kingdom)
The container terminal in Felixstowe is a joint project of Hutchison Whampoa and the Port
Management of Felixstowe. The current terminal consists of 540 acres  and an additional 250
acres  for which a long term lease is granted. The expansion plan has a two year time path and
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wil1 add about 500.00 TEU  in extra transhipment capacity. Total investment is estimated at
114 million Euro. The expansion plan includes a quay  extension of 270 meter and an
additiona125 acres. The extra quay  wil1 be capable of serving two extra container ships. The
three extra cranes are capable of serving ships up to 20 containers -and maybe even 22- wide
on deck.  Included in the investment amount is the transhipment equipment. The current
terminal is studying on adding transhipment equipment worth.34  million Euro’s as well. This
arnotmt  wil1 probably be paid for two quay  cranes and ten rubber-tyred gantry cranes. The 26-
km long charme1 has just been dredged to a depth of handling ships with a draught up to 15
meters (high tide).  The dredging has last 70 weeks and has tost around 46 million Euro.
P&O  Shell Haven Container Terminal (Turrock, Essex)
P&O  and Shell wil1 redevelop this former refinery site  into a container port of 3.5 million
TEU  when fully  developed. The site  wil1 consist of 1,500 acres of land, 3,OOOm  of quays
providing berths for up to ten vessels. The surrounding area wil1 be developed to provide
services like transport and logistics. P&O  wil1 purchase the land required and the site wil1 be
jointly developed with Shell. The Port of London Authority and Thurrock Council form part
of the proposed deal to develop the site. Currently, the site  is wel1 connected by road and rail
to the UK national network, but the capacity of these comrections  wil1 be increased. The total
investment is thought to exceed over 835 million Euro over the next 10-15 years. The
terminal wil1 be built in stages and the fust  phase -ready in 2003 or 2004-  wil1 tost around
167 million Euro.
If we take a closer  look at the different container terminal development models we come  to
the following Table 4.3. This Table shows the relation between container terminal
development types and risks  of investments in infiastructnre.
Table 4.3: Container terminal types and characteristics of investments in infrastructure
Amsterdam Felhtowe  London
Politieal  risk cl GIP
Fi~~nncial risk CYP G/P
Construction risk G/P GITJ
Opcrrtlonal  r i s k  P P
Commercial risk P P
N o n e
G/P
G/P
P
P
G = govemment, P = private party; in this case the ternhal  operator
Source: Wiegmans  et al., 1999
Considering the three case studies and the risks  involved in investments in container terminals
we constructed Table 4.3. In al1 three cases we observe that the private terminal operator runs
the commercial and the operational risk. Financial and construction risks  are shared in al1
three cases. The degree of risk sharing depends on the lease contract conditions. In the case of
a completely new terminal we see that the govemment runs most of the politica1 risk, whereas
in the case of an extension of a container terminal (e.g. Felixstowe) the politica1 risk is shared.
Both the govemment and the terminal operator support the extra investment and try to secure
the  politica1 support. In the case of the redevelopment of an existing site  (a former oil refinery
in the case of London), the politica1 risk is of far less importante, since al1  parties are eager to
transform such  a site into a more productive  area (e.g., a container terminal).
5. Conclusion
In general,  it is stil1 not attractive  to invest in transport infrastructure for private investors.
This is mainly due to some specifïc  risks and costs  caused  by several characteristics (public
good) of transport infrastructure.  Private involvement in fmancing and operating container
terminals in harbours is high compared to other investments in transport infiastructure  such  as
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roads and railways. Both the literature and also  practice  (number of PPP in container terminal
investing) show that this statement holds  largely truc.  In analysing investment projects of
container terminals we fmd that in al1  projects both the govemment and private parties play a
role. In general,  container terminals are an example of a successful cooperation between
government and business. It needs  to be stressed however,  that without govemmental help
risks are stil1 too high in relation to the expected returns on investment for private parties.
This has to do with the fact  that costs of infrastructure are rather  large for private companies.
It appears that public funding via lease structures  is necessary to reduce  investment costs and
to make the operation of a terminal a more attractive (prof’itable)  activity.
Besides, the confirmation of the high involvement of private parties in container terminal
investment projects, we have also  identifïed the particular issue why terminals are more
attractive to private investors than other infrastructure investment projects. Firstly, there was
an earlier recognition of the distinction between container infrastructure and container
services. Port infrastructure is subsidised in most European countries, allowing container
terminal service providers to make (healthy) proftts  at prices,  which are perceived as
reasonable by their customers. Usually rail and road service providers do not make healthy
profits and their users perceive prices  as too high. It can even be stated that profits of
container terminals are paid for by the tax-payer. Secondly, the assignment of infrastructure to
terminal operators in large blocks - which is quite unlike the ‘open access’  stevedoring
arrangements found in some other parts of the world - has restricted competition from new
entrants and protected monopoly profïts (a position that is a contrast with the railways).
The third reason for private sector interest in ports is the productivity gain in recent years, and
the steady fa11 in unit costs due to economies  of scale,  which have not always been passed on
to port users through lower tariffs. Private operators taking over a public facility have usually
been able to improve on past profit levels through the introduction of more flexible labour
practices,  while the limited supply of terminals suitable for leasing and the high costs of
building  new infrastructure allow these profit levels to be maintained.
Furthermore, most port terminals involve relatively low risks after government intervention.
The amounts of private investment required are stil1 reIatively smal1 in comparison with other
modes - the suprastructure for a two berth container terminal costs around ECU 50-100 m,
which is equivalent to only 10-20 km of motorway. Most of the assets  are mobile, with wel1
developed second  hand markets.  Private investment is not such  a leap in the dark as it is in
other transport modes. Or to put it another way, the chance  for profits is higher  to investments
in container terminals than to conventional investments in infrastructure.
A fïfth reason can  be found in container terminal operations. These are becoming too
complicated for cities and regions to perform as a govemmental task. Moreover, operation of
a container terminal is defnritely  no core  business of govemments.
The final factor encouraging private investment is the relatively light regulatory fiamework.
Ports are perceived to operate  in a highly competitive  market, and do not offer a standard
product. There has also  been a convergente of interest between the private operators and their
port authorities, united by their efforts to compete  against other ports.
Rationality (extra employment, seaport tariffs, involvement in networks, etc.) for local
govemments to invest in container terminals has vanished in recent years. Governments
should be much more careful in these bidding processes  for transshipment capacity.
Competition between (in general)  public port authorities for container terminal transshipment
capacity leads to high risk situations for local governmental bodies.
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